Kastely asks a very genuine question: what if someone denies arguing? In other words, how would one argue with someone who is not ready to accept that there exists a situation that demands an argument? I agree with Kastely that the formalistic approaches do not address issues that related to these questions. In the traditional/ common understanding of argument, it is assumed that parties have agreed that there exists a situation that requires argument and they are ready to “fight” to prove themselves right. While reading Toulmin, I hardly thought about that formalistic approach to argumentation although I certainly thought that if arguments in the real world really functioned in so much formulaic way. But, it was Toulmin, and I hardly questioned him. But now, I can see how rigid, formalistic approach to argumentation may not always solve problems pertaining to argumentation.
In my previous post also I talked about difference, and here I also see Kastely dealing with “difference” a lot, but in slightly differently. There, in relation to feminist argumentation, or any argumentation made from the margin for that matter, I was talking about how the inability, or rejection, acknowledge difference, in the name of treating all as “equal” result into unfair ground for argumentation for the two sides, but Kastely talks about difference in terms of the existence of the positions themselves, at the level of existence in the language of statis theory.
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