Hello all. After our dialogue this evening (which was wonderful by the way, the only thing missing was a Californian opinion) we ran out of time before we could talk about our plan of action for when we return from break.
Any suggestions? Anything jump out at you from the syllabus? Perhaps there's something not on the syllabus that you'd like to bring to the class' attention?
Post a comment below with your input :)
Thursday, March 24, 2011
The Contentiousness of Dialogue
Dialogue as presented by Bohm, Factor, & Garrett is an interesting proposal, especially when compared to other people's ideas of what dialogue is (ex: Peters - as noted by Cathy), and it seems that dialogue is itself contentious because there seems to be many interpretations of what dialogue is and isn't. First, I found Peter's interpretation of dialogue to be privileged, to embrace and perform white paternalism, and without compassion. So, with that said I am not really a fan of Peter's ideas of dialogue. Mostly because I believe privilege, white paternalism, and lack of compassion to not be qualities of dialogue. And, as I am being reminded of Peter's interpretation of dialogue I am more inclined to appreciate what Bohm, factor, & Garrett are trying to present. Now,I must say that I think they try to set too many boundaries of what is and isn't dialogue (which is inherently problematic), but at the same time they highlight some really important points that I believe do service to conceptualizing what dialogue is, and can be.
A great starting point to conceptualize what dialogue is would be the concept of listening and it being just as important as speaking. Although listening is supposed to be a general component of communication and not necessarily anything special, it seems that daily communication practices may not appreciate listening as much as dialogue does.To focus on listening, and with an empathetic and compassionate ear, may be a place where people can start to really conceptualize dialogue. This may also be an interesting site to explore arguing differently. Although again, listening is something that should be a core component to arguing and even debate, it may not be practiced as much as it should or could be.
A great starting point to conceptualize what dialogue is would be the concept of listening and it being just as important as speaking. Although listening is supposed to be a general component of communication and not necessarily anything special, it seems that daily communication practices may not appreciate listening as much as dialogue does.To focus on listening, and with an empathetic and compassionate ear, may be a place where people can start to really conceptualize dialogue. This may also be an interesting site to explore arguing differently. Although again, listening is something that should be a core component to arguing and even debate, it may not be practiced as much as it should or could be.
Synthesizing Thoughts
The Tannen book articulated most of my reasons for disliking argument and rhetoric as they play out in popular (often political) culture. One of the reasons I took this class is because I find the combativeness of academic and popular discourse tiring. I don’t mean that in an affected way. I mean it enervates me rather than energizes me.
To me, argument, rhetoric, dialectic---these all relate to how we construct and come to know what we call ‘truth.’ Each is a method of discovery and communication. When it comes to truth, I don’t spell it with a capital T. That being said, I do think rigor is important if hope to have usable and reliable results from inquiry. In other words, truth just is what we call the result of our context-driven inquiry. I’m a fallibilist when it comes to knowledge.
Toulmin gave me new tools for thinking about the structure of the types of arguments I often encounter and find myself constructing. But he also helped me to see the similarities between various argument domains.
My interest in argument stems from my desire to become a good teacher of composition and argument, and my desire to understand the way in which beliefs are arrived at and supported. As our course has developed, I have come to see (have I accepted it, yet?) that formal argument is often post hoc. That is, somehow argumentation doesn’t seem constitutive of belief. It supports belief, but it seems that argument is more negative than positive. That is, it can judge the coherence of professed belief, but I’m not sure argument can motivate us to alter our beliefs. Not any one argument, anyway.
This hasn’t turned out to be much of a synthesis.
I guess I’m not sure in what direction I have moved since the course began.
Dialogue & Speaking into the Air
As I have been reading Dialogue - A Proposal, I have found myself wondering whether it might be beneficial for us to read (at least a portion of) a book that our Communication Theory class read last year: J. D. Peters' Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Peters delineates a contrast between dialogue and dissemination, critiquing what he sees as an ideal of perfection of dialogue that is both unattainable and ultimately damaging to communication. Here is a portion of a summary/reflection that I wrote for Dr. McKinney last year on Peters' opening chapters (Dr. M asks us a series of questions, so these paragraphs do not necessarily flow one to the other):
Q1: If the ideal of communication is defined as the meeting of minds, the consensus and even consubstantiation of two interiorities that are separated by the unbridgeable chasm of their embodiment, then communication will always be imperfect. Our modern experience of communication is marked by a sense that we aren’t really connecting with one another, a “problem” we have attempted to solve either through technology or through therapeutic efforts to improve interpersonal dialogue and understanding.
Q1: If the ideal of communication is defined as the meeting of minds, the consensus and even consubstantiation of two interiorities that are separated by the unbridgeable chasm of their embodiment, then communication will always be imperfect. Our modern experience of communication is marked by a sense that we aren’t really connecting with one another, a “problem” we have attempted to solve either through technology or through therapeutic efforts to improve interpersonal dialogue and understanding.
Q2: Communication as dialogue is exemplified by Plato’s Socrates, who in Phaedrus puts forward a vision of communication that “must be soul-to-soul, among embodied live people, in an intimate interaction that is uniquely fit for each participant” (Peters, p. 47). Communication as dissemination is exemplified by Jesus, who in the parable of the sower, “celebrates broadcasting as an equitable mode of communication that leaves the harvest of meaning to the will and capacity of the recipient” (p. 52). Dialogue is rooted in a longing for union with the untouchable other, while dissemination respects the other’s otherness, giving without thought of receiving in return.
I am persuaded by Peters’ argument, and find his biblical interpretation fascinating, particularly his discussion of reciprocity, gift-giving and love. Schooled in a faith tradition (Lutheranism) that emphasizes the radical grace of God, it is probably natural that I would resonate with this image of communication. However, I am a child of the modern age with its emphasis on dialogue, and I still see a place for that intimate communication that seeks a true meeting of the minds/spirits. I agree with Peters, though, that this is far too great a burden, and actually an intrusion on boundaries, to expect from most communicative encounters.
[note: this question asked us to reflect on Peters' discussion of angels, which he puts forward as an example of pure dialogue] Q3: Because (conceding the traditional view of their existence) angels are not encumbered with bodies or embodied language, they are free to communicate directly with one another and with God, through the immediate exchange of understanding, “fusing together in the bliss of pure intelligence” (p. 74). Time and spatial location make no difference to the transparency of their interiorities. It is this ideal of communication that Peters believes has pervaded our own conceptions of how communication should work, with the consequence that we always fall short. But would we (humans) be better off if we could communicate (with one another) this way? It seems to me that much would be lost – mystery, compassion (how could we “feel with” if we already immediately knew the other?), sense of self, respect for others’ otherness, maybe even love (which entails a certain separateness). Yet, since the ideal of communicating like the angels is, in actuality, impossible, perhaps an alternate question is whether there is any place for such a longing. I believe there is, but agree with Peters that it cannot and should not be the ideal for all communication.
I share what I wrote at length because it provides a background to my question for Bohm & Garrett: is their vision of dialogue even attainable? I can see the value in proprioception as a goal, but it almost seems presumptuous to be trying to do that for someone else - it assumes a transparency of interiorities that seems almost like an invasion of boundaries. And when that is taking place in a group with no designated leader or purpose, it seems like a situation ripe for real damage. Much to think about...
Reflexes and argument
I’m very much impressed and convinced by Bohm’s idea of reflexes. Our value system works at the level of reflexes, and so we are unable to explain them consciously, and so unable to get rid of them. It very much explains how much conditioned we all are in our discussions/ argumentations. Everybody thinks and argues believing that he/ she is right – based on the perception (value systems), he/ she might be right. But from another person’s value systems, that are again working at the level of reflexes, that might be completely unacceptable. It’s certainly a quagmire that we cannot come out of, but perhaps even a realization of this fact might help us become more accommodating in our argumentation. Just a thought!
Synthesizing Continues
"Arguing differently" echoes Kroll a little too much perhaps, especially due to the article, which we have already discussed. But I think that it’s really a worth-discussing and worth-exploring issue, and I’m glad that we have been looking at it from various perspectives – not just limiting to Kroll’s perspectives.
Yes, one issue I think has been argument's relationship to rhetoric. We’ve had some discussion, and some really good insights, and now I’m curious to know what has been written on the issue and if we could discuss them here. I haven’t come across any article or book of this kind yet and so I cannot say whether they really exist, but I think we can talk about it bringing in definitions of rhetoric, argument, dialectic, and even philosophy into discussions (perhaps). That would, I hope, what actually we want to accomplish by involving in an argument (or let’s say by promoting it as a means of civil discourse).
I’m also thinking that it would be useful to think about methods of persuasion that do not involve argument directly. I do not know much about it but I’m thinking about what Perelman talks about in his book under “Demonstration and Argumentation.” We have discussed many things from Perelman but I’m not sure if we had any discussion on this issue. How is demonstrative method different from argumentative method? What are some of the opportunities that demonstrative method might provide us? Could that be interpreted as yet another method of “arguing differently?”
Similarly, we might also consider some other methods of persuasion. Here I remember Kastely’s “From Formalism to Inquiry: A Model for Argument in Antigone.” I think that will fit very well into our discussion. And I’m trying to understand how literary or similar genres of writing might be understood and interpreted as different methods of argumentation. This semester I taught an article by Maureen Dowd, “Our Own Warrior Princess” (http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/01/opinion/our-own-warrior-princess.html), and it was very exciting to see how she makes her argument here. I think Toulminian argumentative methods may not apply in this context. How would classical rhetoric help us understand such genres?
Our discussion of the body in argument has also been very insightful. I suppose we will have more discussion today, based on Bohm’s text. And I think we can take our discussion even further.
Overall, I can see so many things happening in our discussions, and I’m glad that we are exploring the issue of argumentation in such a depth. And look forward to more exciting discussions. Bohm reading....
The beginning chapters of Bohm’s book were easy to understand. I found a lot of things in common. To illustrate, Bohm mentions that our anxieties block the listening and so the communication. We have the same concept in education, especially for second language learners. Being in a different environment, learning a different language may increase their anxiety level (so called affective filter) and inhibit learning. There are numerous researches about lowering the affective filter of the students. However, Bohm does not really mention how to decrease this anxiety so that it will not block the communication much in his chapter. He just states that we need to be aware of it.
I like his chapter about the role of assumptions on communication. I agree that we do observe and judge with our assumptions. But I could not really understand where he wants to go with his chapter on Suspension, the body, and propriocepcion .I think I understood how he used the terms and their meanings but how he wants to combine them with communication is a bit confusing.
I like his chapter about the role of assumptions on communication. I agree that we do observe and judge with our assumptions. But I could not really understand where he wants to go with his chapter on Suspension, the body, and propriocepcion .I think I understood how he used the terms and their meanings but how he wants to combine them with communication is a bit confusing.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Synthesizing also...
This is the first class I take on argumentation, even on rhetoric so lots of things were eye opening for me. In the first book we read, Tannen’s book, I underlined so many pages, put so many stickers around the book. The second, the third… But now as I read Bohm, I feel myself compare and contrast, agree and disagree with him. I believe this is the biggest change in me. I feel the influence of knowledge (cannot be compared to my classmates’) on me, my accepting and not accepting some of the claims.
In addition, I feel like I approach what I hear on TV programs or how I discuss with people differently. Even the most recent one, Bohm’s chapter on assumptions (ch.5) made me reconsider my attitudes in discussions, listening, observing.
Even the class discussions were very useful for me. One day Hayley described an anecdote happened with one of her students and I remember thinking “What I would say if I were that student?”.
As the reading so far, as I stated above the first a few of them were too hard for me to understand but I feel I can get a better grasp of the subjects now. The way people argue has been changing according to needs, culture of the people. The argumentation model that Toulmin has is pretty different than what Aristotle stated. Toulmin and Perelman, though they have some similarities, are different than each other also. The rhetoric model in Asia is different than the ones in West.
In addition, I feel like I approach what I hear on TV programs or how I discuss with people differently. Even the most recent one, Bohm’s chapter on assumptions (ch.5) made me reconsider my attitudes in discussions, listening, observing.
Even the class discussions were very useful for me. One day Hayley described an anecdote happened with one of her students and I remember thinking “What I would say if I were that student?”.
As the reading so far, as I stated above the first a few of them were too hard for me to understand but I feel I can get a better grasp of the subjects now. The way people argue has been changing according to needs, culture of the people. The argumentation model that Toulmin has is pretty different than what Aristotle stated. Toulmin and Perelman, though they have some similarities, are different than each other also. The rhetoric model in Asia is different than the ones in West.
Values, the body, and argument
Role of assumptions and values in the way we look at ourselves and the world is very powerfully expressed by Bohm. When he says the observer is the observed, he is very much contending that we see what we tend to be, i.e. what values we tend to live with. I think that very much relates to the way we think about arguments. Arguments arise for lack of agreement between/ among parties. Hence, every argument situations is bound to bring in different values and assumptions together. How would we be able to make productive arguments within the values we live with?
The idea of proprioception very much explains how we function at the level of body/ emotion and how much we perform any function (what we believe to be doing with a conscious mind) based on the values that we hold. Bohn claims, that “thought lacks proprioception” and by saying so he is asserting that our activities are guided not by thoughts but by emotional/ bodily mechanisms. I think, he is suggesting that our values and assumptions are formed at the emotional/ bodily level. And that is where the issue of tacit knowledge comes in. Why cannot we explain certain processes consciously even though we can perform them?
Communication happens at the level of conscious thought, and as Bohm says thought lacks proprioception. It may mean that we cannot understand what actually goes on when we communicate with others at the level of thought. I am trying to understand it in relation to argument. At the level of conscious thought we may very much believe that we are doing the right thing/ saying the right thing – we are arguing following the right method. But out assumptions and values are the guiding factors that make us feel that way, and it is possible that our perceptions are very different from those with whom we are arguing.
Is it possible to suspend those values as we act? I like what Bohm very boldly claims: it does not happen unless the changes happen at the level of the body (90). This very much interprets our actions as more a bodily performances than the ones performed by conscious thoughts.
We have been talking about the body and argument for some time. And Bohm gives a perfect theoretical grounding to take the discussion even further. Synthesizing
Synthesizing
Well, I have to admit I am not convinced that argument is an umbrella term and that rhetoric falls underneath that; although, I am trying to understand where others are coming from and why they believe so. I guess as of now I just disagree. I am instead convinced that rhetoric is the umbrella term and that argument falls under that, as well as dialectic.
Rhetoric to me is a speech act, whether performed, in text, or as symbol (or in some other form that I am not thinking of at this moment). It also can be without refutation or response. Rhetoric can be part of linear process of communication or a transactional one, and this is one of the main reasons why it is an umbrella term for me. Argument and dialectic, as I understand them, are transactional processes. They require an exchange of ideas. Rhetoric, even with the audience as part of its components, doesn’t have to have an exchange. It can be in a dominating, disseminating, and linear form.
As the readings so far suggest, argument is something that has stemmed from “Western” practices. Aristotle and Plato had differing ideas but it seems the more time passes the more scholarship seems to find some common ground between them that can lead to some of the more productive and positive exchanges of ideas that we can call argument. For example, taking components of rhetoric, dialectic, dialogue, and argument as talked about across our readings shapes a communication activity that can be rhetorical, dialogic, dialectic, argumentative, and can have clash, can be mutually inclusive, and can produce fruitful exchanges.
Monday, March 21, 2011
Communication/ Block
Although I feel that David Bohm discusses the same old idea of impossibility of “perfect” communication between individuals, either due to personal biases or linguistic barriers, he rightly points out the need to find a common place between speakers where both the parties can understand each other to a degree that they feel comfortable.
There is no questioning that there can never be a perfect communication between any two individuals. The writer talks about fear and the love of pleasure as contributing to the lack of communication, since they create a block on the part of both the speaker and the listener. He is right that we are in many situations unable to communicate the way we want due to these personal biases. If we can understand the factors well and pay attention to them it may be possible that we communicate rightly and understand each other. This is an easy and an ideal method the writer talks about in the article. However, communication is a more subtle and much more complex phenomenon. Communication is all about how two people, with their own world-views and perspectives, trying to come to terms about certain worldly or even imagined phenomenon. And they have to that through a signifying system where each components of the system is metaphorical, and each individual understands and interprets it in his or her own ways. Hence, communication is always a hard subject.
Sunday, March 20, 2011
Tacit Knowledge
A representative sentence from Bohm's chapter 6: "So the first point is: is it possible to suspend the action without suppressing it? If you finde it is not possible, then you observe the process of suppression without suppressing the suppression." The prose in these chapters often had me spinning in circles. If I understand, generally, what Bohm is talking about throughout these chapters, than I think this type of circular reasoning, reinforcement, and complicated simplicity forces his reader to enact his strategies for improving the communication gap. This style of writing gave me consistent emotional reactions, ones that I was aware of throughout the chapters.
While I wasn't always sure what was going on in Bohm, I was able to appreciate some his discussion of tacit knowledge. Bohm brings up tacit knowledge to explain the shift from incoherence to coherence (pages 89-91). For this change to take place, Bohm contends, must take place in the space of concrete thought itself. Abstract thought is not enough to take the mind from incoherence to coherence.
His example in this section is a familiar one, once you learn how to ride a bike yaddayaddayadd, but the idea of unconscious knowledge brought up another example in my mind. In 2006, Michael Pollan wrote a book called the Omnivore's Dilemma. Pollan, a journalism professor at UC Berkeley, traces a 'natural history' of three meals through the book, but in his introduction he meditates on a the dilemma facing all omnivoric animals in the world: how do I know what food is? It is truly an amazing thing to watch an animal approach an unknown object, and go through the steps to decide if that object is food or not. Where does this knowledge come from? How are certain omnivores so good at eating things that nourish them and ignoring things that might poison them? I think this is an apt example for a few reasons. First of all, the omnivore's ability to differentiate relies on evolutionary memory as well as learned memory. The second reason is that the tacit knowledge of what to eat impacts the actions of the omnivore as well. I'm not sure exactly how these two are connected, but hopefully rereading and discussing Bohm might make it easier to see.
Food and memory are strongly linked, no question. One reason this could be true is that, once upon a time, we had to make life-and-death decisions about what to eat and what to let be. The stronger our memory functioned in this realm, the more likely we were to learn from our previous mistakes. Perhaps this is less about memory and more about tacit knowledge.
While I wasn't always sure what was going on in Bohm, I was able to appreciate some his discussion of tacit knowledge. Bohm brings up tacit knowledge to explain the shift from incoherence to coherence (pages 89-91). For this change to take place, Bohm contends, must take place in the space of concrete thought itself. Abstract thought is not enough to take the mind from incoherence to coherence.
His example in this section is a familiar one, once you learn how to ride a bike yaddayaddayadd, but the idea of unconscious knowledge brought up another example in my mind. In 2006, Michael Pollan wrote a book called the Omnivore's Dilemma. Pollan, a journalism professor at UC Berkeley, traces a 'natural history' of three meals through the book, but in his introduction he meditates on a the dilemma facing all omnivoric animals in the world: how do I know what food is? It is truly an amazing thing to watch an animal approach an unknown object, and go through the steps to decide if that object is food or not. Where does this knowledge come from? How are certain omnivores so good at eating things that nourish them and ignoring things that might poison them? I think this is an apt example for a few reasons. First of all, the omnivore's ability to differentiate relies on evolutionary memory as well as learned memory. The second reason is that the tacit knowledge of what to eat impacts the actions of the omnivore as well. I'm not sure exactly how these two are connected, but hopefully rereading and discussing Bohm might make it easier to see.
Food and memory are strongly linked, no question. One reason this could be true is that, once upon a time, we had to make life-and-death decisions about what to eat and what to let be. The stronger our memory functioned in this realm, the more likely we were to learn from our previous mistakes. Perhaps this is less about memory and more about tacit knowledge.
Thursday, March 17, 2011
Some synthesizing thoughts of mine...please add yours
I’d like to record here some things I’ve been thinking about as I’ve been teaching the Arguing Differently course.
First, a big revelation for me has been the realization that “argument” is a broader term than “rhetoric,” that argument includes the back-and-forthness of what Artistotle calls “dialectic” and what Plato records Socrates practicing in the dialogues. And argument includes the extended persuasive discourse of public address. What both have in common is the presentation of proof, of claim and evidence, whether in a give and take way or in a seemingly boundaried artifact.
Of course, no artifact is boundaried, and so that is why Brummett, for example, understands rhetoric to be a function rather than an artifact. Rhetoric works across boundaries. But even then, we still have the circulation of proofs with explicit or implicit claims—sometimes associations (affective and metonymic--networked) in addition to direct articulations (linked through language and so more metaphoric/analogic).
But when argument is taught in composition classrooms (and perhaps in speech communication classrooms?) the focus tends to be on the formal goal of an isolated artifact. It isn’t that those artifacts don’t matter—certainly, they do, at least in academia and also in other kinds of contexts (political communication, organizational communication, etc.). It’s just that underlying those stopping points (or pause points?) of argument is the ongoing process of dialectic: claim and proof, claim and proof, claim and proof. What counts as a claim tends to change depending on the context, but certainly what counts as proof changes depending on the context. What different audiences value is different. Maybe a bit circular, but still true.
So when I was thinking about the circulating arguments textbook, I hadn’t figured this out, and so it was hard to figure out what I wanted the textbook to teach. I think what a textbook like that might teach is the process of proof and claim and how no isolated document is enough, It’s just one node in an ongoing network of proof and claim. So is it possible to learn to navigate and participate at both levels?
There’s also the piece of traveling argument, how a “claim” in one arena is taken up in other arenas and changed in terms of the underlying values. This is the kind of work both Jenny and Rebecca talk about.
My interest is pedagogical and practical: how are people actually moved to act? (And that question is perhaps better approached by people who study the rhetoric of social movements.) And how/what might we teach when we teach argument in order not to solidify argument as a boundaried, formal piece of writing or speech? (Or, even worse, as simply the verbal fighting that happens in much popular public discourse?)
I would love to see each of you to do some synthesizing thinking of your own. How so far have you been able to think about arguments in new ways, to maybe bring together strands of your thought?
First, a big revelation for me has been the realization that “argument” is a broader term than “rhetoric,” that argument includes the back-and-forthness of what Artistotle calls “dialectic” and what Plato records Socrates practicing in the dialogues. And argument includes the extended persuasive discourse of public address. What both have in common is the presentation of proof, of claim and evidence, whether in a give and take way or in a seemingly boundaried artifact.
Of course, no artifact is boundaried, and so that is why Brummett, for example, understands rhetoric to be a function rather than an artifact. Rhetoric works across boundaries. But even then, we still have the circulation of proofs with explicit or implicit claims—sometimes associations (affective and metonymic--networked) in addition to direct articulations (linked through language and so more metaphoric/analogic).
But when argument is taught in composition classrooms (and perhaps in speech communication classrooms?) the focus tends to be on the formal goal of an isolated artifact. It isn’t that those artifacts don’t matter—certainly, they do, at least in academia and also in other kinds of contexts (political communication, organizational communication, etc.). It’s just that underlying those stopping points (or pause points?) of argument is the ongoing process of dialectic: claim and proof, claim and proof, claim and proof. What counts as a claim tends to change depending on the context, but certainly what counts as proof changes depending on the context. What different audiences value is different. Maybe a bit circular, but still true.
So when I was thinking about the circulating arguments textbook, I hadn’t figured this out, and so it was hard to figure out what I wanted the textbook to teach. I think what a textbook like that might teach is the process of proof and claim and how no isolated document is enough, It’s just one node in an ongoing network of proof and claim. So is it possible to learn to navigate and participate at both levels?
There’s also the piece of traveling argument, how a “claim” in one arena is taken up in other arenas and changed in terms of the underlying values. This is the kind of work both Jenny and Rebecca talk about.
My interest is pedagogical and practical: how are people actually moved to act? (And that question is perhaps better approached by people who study the rhetoric of social movements.) And how/what might we teach when we teach argument in order not to solidify argument as a boundaried, formal piece of writing or speech? (Or, even worse, as simply the verbal fighting that happens in much popular public discourse?)
I would love to see each of you to do some synthesizing thinking of your own. How so far have you been able to think about arguments in new ways, to maybe bring together strands of your thought?
Symbolism- A way to think about arguing differently
In my personal blog this week I talk about symbolism. Crowley said "symbols represent belief, but they also produce it" (65). I am exploring this further to see if this could be a way to think about arguing differently. For example, if we think of symbols, and even bodies as symbols, we can possibly expand how we think about argument and rhetoric. Typically and traditionally rhetoric is though of as the art of persuasion, as the art of public speaking, as an art typically tied to a speech act.
In the communication discipline performance theory suggests that performance is also communication, and arguably can be rhetorical.
With this, I believe we can think of arguing, of rhetoric, of debate- as different.
If we explore symbols, and even bodies as symbolic, we can possibly entertain rhetoric in a different way that has been traditionally taught and thought of.
For example, if we were to think of major topics for debate and argument through traditional rhetorical and argumentation lenses, we could potentially look past symbols, and the symbolic and rhetorical nature of bodies. Thus, I propose as an individual exercise to think about your own topic of exploration in this class, and ask: Would it, could it be thought of differently if you were to focus on symbolism and even bodies?
In the communication discipline performance theory suggests that performance is also communication, and arguably can be rhetorical.
With this, I believe we can think of arguing, of rhetoric, of debate- as different.
If we explore symbols, and even bodies as symbolic, we can possibly entertain rhetoric in a different way that has been traditionally taught and thought of.
For example, if we were to think of major topics for debate and argument through traditional rhetorical and argumentation lenses, we could potentially look past symbols, and the symbolic and rhetorical nature of bodies. Thus, I propose as an individual exercise to think about your own topic of exploration in this class, and ask: Would it, could it be thought of differently if you were to focus on symbolism and even bodies?
Crowley & Reformulation
I like Crowley's notion of rhetoric as finding a new way, opening a new path. I think this is important for her argument, and it has something in common with Kroll's take on pragmatism and reformulation. (One philosopher, I think I brought him up last week, who seems to agree with Crowley is Kwame Antony Appiah. His new book (subtitled: How Moral Revolutions Happen) is a work of philosophy filled with stories meant to persuade via emotional connection. Appiah wants to emphasize the role "honor" plays in creating change in our ethical climate.) By the end of her book, I had to recall that she was fairly pessimistic about the rhetors chances of opening a new way with fundamentalists. Early on in the book, Crowley says that her motivating concern is for open, careful public discussion. She ends with suggestions for how to engage fundamentalists in such discussions. Even here, she seems fairly unconvinced (intentional) by her own argument. That is, I think she has done in her diagnosis, but she seems more convinced that not tactic will work with fundamentalism. If this is the case, why should the liberals she critiques change course?
Reason & Rhetoric
What a relief to finally hear someone talk about the exclusion inherent in liberalism:
I haven't read the 18th-century Rhetorics that she cites (I will!), but, of course, figures like Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and David Hume often pointed out the limited scope reason could (and should) play in human affairs. Swift went so far as to note that man is only capable of reason. Hume was less likely to emphasize reason when it came to issues of politics and morality. Of course, he was politically conservative as a result. That is, Hume felt that our passional side needed the restraints of custom and tradition.
A slight irritation: As is often the case with postmodern philosophy, Crowley, I think, is too quick to accept that the Moderns did not understand what Derrida called "difference." I would say that it is one thing to dramatize this fact of language and another to understand it. Of course our concepts are reflexive (Laurence Sterne used this very concept to create great comedy). The idea that Derrida or Bourdieu or Rorty are the first to understand and consider this fact is simply ahistorical. I don't know why this always irritates me, but it does. I think it is because it fails to acknowledge how truly skeptical of reason and aware of language the enlightenment thinkers were.
Liberal pluralism harbors the hope that difference can be erased if only everyone will just be reasonable--which means something like "think as we do" (Crowley 41).I think Crowley is right, and she seems to be pointing out a contradiction at the heart of liberalism's insistence on reason. While it presents itself as value neutral, it clearly is not value neutral: It values reason. I don't think Crowley is saying that this evaluation is wrong. She seems to be saying that liberalism places too great an emphasis on it. Reason at all costs. Reason as the only conversation worth having.
I haven't read the 18th-century Rhetorics that she cites (I will!), but, of course, figures like Jonathan Swift, Laurence Sterne, and David Hume often pointed out the limited scope reason could (and should) play in human affairs. Swift went so far as to note that man is only capable of reason. Hume was less likely to emphasize reason when it came to issues of politics and morality. Of course, he was politically conservative as a result. That is, Hume felt that our passional side needed the restraints of custom and tradition.
A slight irritation: As is often the case with postmodern philosophy, Crowley, I think, is too quick to accept that the Moderns did not understand what Derrida called "difference." I would say that it is one thing to dramatize this fact of language and another to understand it. Of course our concepts are reflexive (Laurence Sterne used this very concept to create great comedy). The idea that Derrida or Bourdieu or Rorty are the first to understand and consider this fact is simply ahistorical. I don't know why this always irritates me, but it does. I think it is because it fails to acknowledge how truly skeptical of reason and aware of language the enlightenment thinkers were.
Feelings and arguing differently
I agree with Crowley that feelings can move a person to different directions and make that person say things that s/he does not really believe in. In the past, when the army was going to war the kings were making some moving speeches to the soldiers(I believe the best sample is the Henry V’s speech to the troops), in addition, in Ottoman army there was a orchestra to move the feelings of the soldiers. (Mehter, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_military_band) The role of feelings in arguing differently cannot be ignored. I think today most of the discussions take place in a way that the anchor tries to make the sides really get mad, cause them start yelling and so on; and ultimately increase rating.(I cannot say it is the case for all of the discussion programs but unfortunately it is not uncommon, either).
However, if the discussions are to arrive a conclusion or solutions, this should not be the case. In fact, the interfaith dialog movements have been damaged with these kinds of blames in the past. Muslims, Christians, Jews who believed in interfaith dialog have been accused changing their faith or not being a real believer (Kurucan, 2006). These blames caused different feelings to occur in people and they lost their faith in the religious leaders, or religious leaders stepped back in their efforts in interfaith dialog.
I liked Crowley’s book so far, but I could not really understand where she wants to arrive with the discussions on Apocalyptism. I hope we will discuss about these tonight.
Enjoy the weather outside, we really missed it:)))
However, if the discussions are to arrive a conclusion or solutions, this should not be the case. In fact, the interfaith dialog movements have been damaged with these kinds of blames in the past. Muslims, Christians, Jews who believed in interfaith dialog have been accused changing their faith or not being a real believer (Kurucan, 2006). These blames caused different feelings to occur in people and they lost their faith in the religious leaders, or religious leaders stepped back in their efforts in interfaith dialog.
I liked Crowley’s book so far, but I could not really understand where she wants to arrive with the discussions on Apocalyptism. I hope we will discuss about these tonight.
Enjoy the weather outside, we really missed it:)))
Defending 'Spin' as Rhetoric
Crowley suggests that today people identify rhetoric as spin, but she challenges this idea and posits that spin is not rhetoric. Instead she states that
“spin is what people spout when they want to cloud the issue rather than clarify it, or when they have nothing of consequence to impart but are expected to speak nonetheless. Spin interprets facts in a light favorable to the interpreter, and its practice implies that facts may be unintelligible or even dangerous if encountered unspun.” (Crowley, p. 26).
She then gives an example of how Al Sharptons had spoke at the 2004 Democratic convention reminding his audience of the “price African Americans have paid for the right to vote” (Crowley, p. 26) and how reporters “spun Sharpton’s artful and moving rhetoric into irrelevance” (p. 26). She suggests that this example justifies her claim that spin isn't rhetoric.
I have to say that I don’t agree with her on this idea that spin is not rhetoric, that it can’t at times be rhetorical, and that it is inherently not rhetorical. Additionally, I don’t believe she makes a compelling argument here either and I believe that things she says later possibly discredit what she claims about spin.
First, if spin is not rhetorical- ever- then what is its purpose? If its purpose is not persuasion, if its purpose is not to reframe rhetorical acts of speech, events, and action, what is its purpose? And if its purpose is persuasion, how could it never be considered rhetorical? And if its purpose is to reframe rhetorical acts, how is that not rhetorical?
It seems to me that spin itself is highly rhetorical. The purpose of spin is to persuade the audience that ones interpretation of acts & events is superior to another’s. Additionally, to spin something is to compete with others over interpretation and at that point there is acknowledged stasis and clash.
What I also find interesting is further in her readings, when talking about the abortion debate between pro-lifers and pro-choicers, she states that each side is not engaging in argument because they are ultimately talking about different things and not finding a direct moment of clash, or stasis. To explain the lack of argument she claims that partisans, people, “may not know that it is possible to frame propositions in such a way that a disagreement can achieve stasis and hence open the possibility of exchange. Or perhaps no party is willing to do the hard intellectual work that is necessary to construct refutations of the premises put forward by another” (p. 30)
This last passage is interesting to me because it seems to challenge her own assertions about spin. Let me see if I can be clear here. She claims that spin is not rhetoric, but that it is something else that complicates, blurs, has bias, and may leave things unintelligible- but why does this have to be? Can’t spin also be interpreted as rhetoric? Can’t spin be seen as one persons way of (as she states) framing propositions in such a way that a disagreement can achieve stasis and hence open the possibility of exchange? Can’t spin be an example of this intellectual hard work that is necessary to construct refutations of the premises put forward by another? Can’t spinning in itself become arguments and debates over acts and events?
I guess, for me,I need her to do some more explaining here in order for me to dismiss the art of spinning. To spin something, is to me, a rhetorical act. To spin something is to rhetorically and purposefully interpret with the intent to persuade. To spin is to create a new frame, it is to posit a position, it is rhetorical and able to be engaged. Whether or not the intentions are desirable at all times, whether or not spinning is the ideal form of rhetoric, whether or not we want to acknowledge this as rhetoric because of its stigmas- I think we may not want to dismiss spin so easy as something that isn’t rhetorical. And if we did, if we let Crowley tell us that spin isn’t rhetorical, doesn’t this invite us to not engage it? To not be literate in its use and understanding it? What then would be the impacts of dismissing spin as something that isn’t rhetorical?
Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Arguing the "Unarguable"
I’m not very sure if there is anything unarguable. But it’s not hard to find people with the strong opinion that there are certain things that we cannot argue about – things for them are already settled, and any effort to argue about those issues are only an effort to argue for argument’s sake. I think that that thought is guided by Platonic world-view – there are certain truths out there in the world (or beyond the world) and whether we argue about them or not, it won’t change the truth. Moreover, the effort to argue about certain things is, for them, disrespect to certain beliefs (which can hardly be questioned). In that sense, argument is very much constrained by what values one holds.
Crowley’s concern with the issues that are in general considered unarguable, or at least are thought to be uncomfortable topics for discussions, is really worth-appreciating. I have also found that some people are not willing to debate over certain issues. Whatever might be the reason behind it, it is not hard to assume that one of the reasons people do not feel comfortable to discuss such issues, like religion and politics, is that they feel that their values are threatened when they are engaged in such debates. First, such positions hold that there cannot be any other world-view (they have already accepted that their values are the only values worth-paying attention to), and at the same time, they feel that by allowing debate, or at least by getting engaged in the debate, they happen to legitimize opposition to some extent (which I think is true to a large extent). More importantly, they cannot imagine the other side prevail over their own values. In fact, the inability to get engaged in a debate speaks of that complete rejection of any possibility that might go against one’s belief.
Susan Bordo
Monday's snowy weather didn't prevent a renowned scholar from giving a talk on campus. Susan Bordo holds an endowed chair position at the University of Kentucky, where she is a member of the Women's and Gender Studies and English departments. Affiliations aside, she is one of the foremost Feminist philosophers and is credited with pioneering Body Studies as a discipline. Considering Professor Strickland's research interests, it was no surprise to see her there as well. The talk was called "Beyond Eating Disorders" and explored the intricacies of the relationships between bodies, culture, capitalism, and the historical implications of all of these. It was fascinating, and I'd be happy to talk with you if you want to know more.
The reason I went to this particular talk (besides the catered reception and free wine) was because of the connection between contemporary eating disorders and my interest in the cultural implications of food. I've been working with my students to see the myriad of different ways food impacts their daily lives on all levels of the food chain (production, distribution, consumption, etc). Thinking about eating disorders as a result of the preceding moments on the chain, gives me a much different understanding of those disorders. Part of Bordo's talk was addressing the social stigma that eating disorders are wholly psychological or defects of character, which coalesced nicely with my understanding of the food chain as impacting more than just what's on our plates.
On a side note, I was lucky enough to have attended the 'meet and greet' for students prior to the talk. I say lucky because I was the only person who showed up (besides LuAnn Roth, an English professor who has been coordinating the entire year-long Food & Society series), and had over an hour to talk with Bordo. It was a great opportunity, not only to be able to talk to one of the most distinguished contemporary American feminist philosophers, but to get to hear her take on academics, conferences, and her life as a professor. Her take on academic writing was different than others I have heard, in that she strives to bring her academic prose, her challenging concepts, and her overall message to a level that most (if not all) audiences can appreciate. She told me that one of the most gratifying things that happens to her is when a non-academic, non-college-aged person tells her how much impact her work has had on his/her life. She also teaches a graduate-level course on 'popularizing' esoteric, academic prose to be read by a more general audience. This idea was contrary to what I assumed of academic work, especially that of Philosophers.
Lots of ideas here that play into our discussions of Arguing Differently. Care to comment?
The reason I went to this particular talk (besides the catered reception and free wine) was because of the connection between contemporary eating disorders and my interest in the cultural implications of food. I've been working with my students to see the myriad of different ways food impacts their daily lives on all levels of the food chain (production, distribution, consumption, etc). Thinking about eating disorders as a result of the preceding moments on the chain, gives me a much different understanding of those disorders. Part of Bordo's talk was addressing the social stigma that eating disorders are wholly psychological or defects of character, which coalesced nicely with my understanding of the food chain as impacting more than just what's on our plates.
On a side note, I was lucky enough to have attended the 'meet and greet' for students prior to the talk. I say lucky because I was the only person who showed up (besides LuAnn Roth, an English professor who has been coordinating the entire year-long Food & Society series), and had over an hour to talk with Bordo. It was a great opportunity, not only to be able to talk to one of the most distinguished contemporary American feminist philosophers, but to get to hear her take on academics, conferences, and her life as a professor. Her take on academic writing was different than others I have heard, in that she strives to bring her academic prose, her challenging concepts, and her overall message to a level that most (if not all) audiences can appreciate. She told me that one of the most gratifying things that happens to her is when a non-academic, non-college-aged person tells her how much impact her work has had on his/her life. She also teaches a graduate-level course on 'popularizing' esoteric, academic prose to be read by a more general audience. This idea was contrary to what I assumed of academic work, especially that of Philosophers.
Lots of ideas here that play into our discussions of Arguing Differently. Care to comment?
Religion in the Public Square
Of all the weeks to be grading 40 papers on top of my own work! I could be spending the entire week on a close reading of Crowley, and could already have posted about five times on here in response to what I am reading. THIS is what I study! Why did I not know about this book yet? Last year I did a lit review for my final paper in Political Communication, in anticipation of what will likely be my focus area for my dissertation. In the lit review I examined the intersection of public church and public square, with a particular eye to the public participation of religious voices in the political process, especially NON-fundamentalist voices. With that lit review in my head, I already have a couple of concerns about the binaries Crowley is drawing.
First, I want to take a step back and remember Tannen's insight that binaries sometimes exclude perspectives that do not fit the two "sides" in an argument. Certainly, mainline and progressive voices (despite Crowley's brief nod to Sojourners (p. 9) ) are left out of a binary between liberalism and fundamentalism. I realize that Crowley is intentional in her focus on fundamentalists/apocalypticism (p. 7), but one of my ongoing frustrations with the current framing of religion in the political process is the seeming assumption that mainline voices do not have the power to be persuasive or of interest to scholars. As the junior political comm faculty person said when I told him I want to study progressive religious voices in the political process: "what, all two of them?" !!
More importantly, however, is that in drawing this binary, Crowley seems to be accepting (so far - I'm on the second chapter) a deeper binary that assumes liberals want to confine religion to the private sphere. She notes that fundamentalists do not like this confining (p. 11), and speaks of the fights over the ten commandments monument (what one scholar (Clement, 2009) has called "public displays of affection for God" but this misses the fact that there are liberal religious voices who also seek a public witness (and in fact are already pursuing that witness through their Washington lobbying offices, among other means). It is just that the public witness of liberal/mainline religious voices is going to do things like ask "how is this legislation going to affect the poor and marginalized?" or "what will that initiative do to the environment?" rather than try to get public displays of affection for God put up as part of a culture war.
Speaking from my own tradition, here is a brief section that I included in my paper last year: Lutherans do not believe that the Christian voice is due special treatment in the public square, but do believe that the church has a vital role to play in reminding the state of its primary obligation to serve the public good. Ultimately, “Lutherans are committed to the integrity of church and state, to their practical interaction, indeed cooperation for the common good in a constitutional order that guarantees religious freedom for all” (Stumme & Tuttle, 2003, p. 69).
It is my hope to focus my dissertation on how mainline and progressive voices can be wise as a serpent and gentle as a dove in getting our message out there (how we can argue differently, perhaps?). I look forward to continuing to wrestle with Crowley's work as I move towards that goal.
First, I want to take a step back and remember Tannen's insight that binaries sometimes exclude perspectives that do not fit the two "sides" in an argument. Certainly, mainline and progressive voices (despite Crowley's brief nod to Sojourners (p. 9) ) are left out of a binary between liberalism and fundamentalism. I realize that Crowley is intentional in her focus on fundamentalists/apocalypticism (p. 7), but one of my ongoing frustrations with the current framing of religion in the political process is the seeming assumption that mainline voices do not have the power to be persuasive or of interest to scholars. As the junior political comm faculty person said when I told him I want to study progressive religious voices in the political process: "what, all two of them?" !!
More importantly, however, is that in drawing this binary, Crowley seems to be accepting (so far - I'm on the second chapter) a deeper binary that assumes liberals want to confine religion to the private sphere. She notes that fundamentalists do not like this confining (p. 11), and speaks of the fights over the ten commandments monument (what one scholar (Clement, 2009) has called "public displays of affection for God" but this misses the fact that there are liberal religious voices who also seek a public witness (and in fact are already pursuing that witness through their Washington lobbying offices, among other means). It is just that the public witness of liberal/mainline religious voices is going to do things like ask "how is this legislation going to affect the poor and marginalized?" or "what will that initiative do to the environment?" rather than try to get public displays of affection for God put up as part of a culture war.
Speaking from my own tradition, here is a brief section that I included in my paper last year: Lutherans do not believe that the Christian voice is due special treatment in the public square, but do believe that the church has a vital role to play in reminding the state of its primary obligation to serve the public good. Ultimately, “Lutherans are committed to the integrity of church and state, to their practical interaction, indeed cooperation for the common good in a constitutional order that guarantees religious freedom for all” (Stumme & Tuttle, 2003, p. 69).
It is my hope to focus my dissertation on how mainline and progressive voices can be wise as a serpent and gentle as a dove in getting our message out there (how we can argue differently, perhaps?). I look forward to continuing to wrestle with Crowley's work as I move towards that goal.
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