Some things I am walking away with

The Crenshaw piece & the Fulkerson piece both have a few things that I will walk away with.

First, the Crenshaw piece is pretty great because it highlights something that I have been arguing since my years as a debater, which is that: Our legal system is inherently patriarchal. Additionally, it supports this claim and expands on this idea in form and function through a case study, and shows how it continues to be patriarchal through current examples in the case study. So, not only do I like that he supports one of the claims that I like to make, but he backs up the claim well.

Additionally, the execution of this case study is also worth a pat on the back. Not only do I appreciate the ways that Crenshaw shows how women, through the equality argument, are pitted against the man (the norm), but I also appreciate the way he reverses lines of argument to show and make clear harms, limitations, and opportunities. This practice of reversing arguments to highlight limits may even be something that can be useful for Lane's proposal of the study of limits in feminist scholarship.

Next, at first I was a bit weary of the Fulkerson article after the first few paragraphs, but I like it for a few reasons. First, he does a nice job of establishing credibility and this example may be used to help others in understanding how this is and can be done. Next, I like his debunking/critique of the feminist critiques:  The equity critique and the cognitive/development critique. I think he makes excellent points in both. For the equity critique I concur with one of his major points which is that "most writers who articulate the equity critique simultaneously violate it, but attempting to argue readers into sharing their views" (Fulkerson, 1996). Additionally, I am not convinced either that persuasion is inherently violent. If so, people should stop talking now. Just stop. Because I believe that a lot of communication is rhetorical, and as such- persuasive.

Next, as was mentioned in my previous post- and is discussed in this article, the cognitive/developmental critique has "frequently led to essentializing stereotypes".

Overall, I think that both the substance of these articles and their form and functions are worthy of more attention and bring things to the table for feminist rhetoricians to engage, practice, and further explore.








Crenshaw, C. (1996). The normality of man and the female otherness: (Re)producing patriarchal lines of argument in the law. Argumentation and Advocacy, 32(4). 170.

Fulkerson, R. (1996). Transcending our conception of argument in the light of feminist critiques. Argumentation and Advocacy, 32(4). 199.

ok so it's not just me....lableing practices to be feminine & masculine can reify gender stereotypes

I just finished the piece by Lane titled "Producing identities: Gender problematization and feminist argumentation" and it is  really nice to see that some of what I have tried to articulate in the past with lots of backlash exists in other people's minds as well.

I have always felt uncomfortable with labeling speech, rhetoric, debate, and/or argumentation practices as either feminine and/or masculine. And, I have particularly felt uncomfortable when this type of labeling is done within the proposed framework/lens of "feminist". As Lane (1996) notes, this risks reifying gender stereotypes more than problematizing them .

What I like about this piece, not only that it critiques  feminist practices that re-entrench gender stereotypes, is that it offers an alternative. Lane (1996) suggests "limit work" and identifies this as "a theory of subjectivity based upon the assumption that all language systems, and more specifically all identities are simultaneously enabling and constraining". She further states that the "goal of limit work is to analyze systems of constraint in order to determine their productive/constraining ratios" (Lane, 1996).

I believe that this alternative practice of limit work can be a viable approach to studying rhetoric, argumentation, and speech. A major advantage of this approach is that it not only is very critical and highlights of course what is problematic, but it also allows for discussion of positives, what is done well, what enables. The combination, which ideally won't fall too much into the real of binarism, allows for openings and more insight into what one is studying. For me, someone who is interested in political movements, their campaigns, and their advertisements, and is especially concerned with social justice, this approach seems as though it could provide for some useful findings that could potentially add to existing knowledge and possible improvements with social justice campaigns and movements.

Synthesizing also...

This is the first class I take on argumentation, even on rhetoric so lots of things were eye opening for me. In the first book we read, Tannen’s book, I underlined so many pages, put so many stickers around the book. The second, the third… But now as I read Bohm, I feel myself compare and contrast, agree and disagree with him. I believe this is the biggest change in me. I feel the influence of knowledge (cannot be compared to my classmates’) on me, my accepting and not accepting some of the claims.
In addition, I feel like I approach what I hear on TV programs or how I discuss with people differently. Even the most recent one, Bohm’s chapter on assumptions (ch.5) made me reconsider my attitudes in discussions, listening, observing.
Even the class discussions were very useful for me. One day Hayley described an anecdote happened with one of her students and I remember thinking “What I would say if I were that student?”.
As the reading so far, as I stated above the first a few of them were too hard for me to understand but I feel I can get a better grasp of the subjects now. The way people argue has been changing according to needs, culture of the people. The argumentation model that Toulmin has is pretty different than what Aristotle stated. Toulmin and Perelman, though they have some similarities, are different than each other also. The rhetoric model in Asia is different than the ones in West.

Synthesizing

Synthesizing 

Well, I have to admit I am not convinced that argument is an umbrella term and that rhetoric falls underneath that; although, I am trying to understand where others are coming from and why they believe so. I guess as of now I just disagree. I am instead convinced that rhetoric is the umbrella term and that argument falls under that, as well as dialectic. 

Rhetoric to me is a speech act, whether performed, in text, or as symbol (or in some other form that I am not thinking of at this moment). It also can be without refutation or response. Rhetoric can be part of linear process of communication or a transactional one, and this is one of the main reasons why it is an umbrella term for me. Argument and dialectic, as I understand them, are transactional processes. They require an exchange of ideas. Rhetoric, even with the audience as part of its components, doesn’t have to have an exchange. It can be in a dominating, disseminating, and linear form. 

As the readings so far suggest, argument is something that has stemmed from “Western” practices. Aristotle and Plato had differing ideas but it seems the more time passes the more scholarship seems to find some common ground between them that can lead to some of the more productive and positive exchanges of ideas that we can call argument. For example, taking components of rhetoric, dialectic, dialogue, and argument as talked about across our readings shapes a communication activity that can be rhetorical, dialogic, dialectic, argumentative, and can have clash, can be mutually inclusive, and can produce fruitful exchanges.

Symbolism- A way to think about arguing differently

In my personal blog this week I talk about symbolism. Crowley said "symbols represent belief, but they also produce it" (65). I am exploring this further to see if this could be a way to think about arguing differently. For example, if we think of symbols, and even bodies as symbols, we can possibly expand how we think about argument and rhetoric. Typically and traditionally rhetoric is though of as the art of persuasion, as the art of public speaking, as an art typically tied to a speech act.

In the communication discipline performance theory suggests that performance is also communication, and arguably can be rhetorical.

With this, I believe we can think of arguing, of rhetoric, of debate- as different.

If we explore symbols, and even bodies as symbolic, we can possibly entertain rhetoric in a different way that has been traditionally taught and thought of.

For example, if we were to think of major topics for debate and argument through traditional rhetorical and argumentation lenses, we could potentially look past symbols, and the symbolic and rhetorical nature of bodies. Thus, I propose as an individual exercise to think about your own topic of exploration in this class, and ask: Would it, could it be thought of differently if you were to focus on symbolism and even bodies? 

Defending 'Spin' as Rhetoric

Crowley suggests that today people identify rhetoric as spin, but she challenges this idea and posits that spin is not rhetoric.  Instead she states that

“spin is what people spout when they want to cloud the issue rather than clarify it, or when they have nothing of consequence to impart but are expected to speak nonetheless. Spin interprets facts in a light favorable to the interpreter, and its practice implies that facts may be unintelligible  or even dangerous if encountered unspun.” (Crowley, p. 26). 

She then gives an example of how Al Sharptons had spoke at the 2004 Democratic convention reminding  his audience of the “price African Americans have paid for the right to vote” (Crowley, p. 26) and how  reporters “spun Sharpton’s artful and moving rhetoric into irrelevance” (p. 26). She suggests that this example justifies her claim that spin isn't rhetoric.

I have to say that I don’t agree with her on this idea that spin is not rhetoric, that it can’t at times be rhetorical, and that it is inherently not rhetorical. Additionally, I don’t believe she makes a compelling argument here either and I believe that things she says later possibly discredit what she claims about spin. 

First, if spin is not rhetorical- ever- then what is its purpose? If its purpose is not persuasion, if its purpose is not to reframe rhetorical acts of speech, events, and action, what is its purpose? And if its purpose is persuasion, how could it never be considered rhetorical? And if its purpose is to reframe rhetorical acts, how is that not rhetorical?

It seems to me that spin itself is highly rhetorical. The purpose of spin is to persuade the audience that ones interpretation of acts & events is superior to another’s. Additionally, to spin something is to compete with others over interpretation and at that point there is acknowledged stasis and clash.

What I also find interesting is further in her readings, when talking about the abortion debate between pro-lifers and pro-choicers, she states that each side is not engaging in argument because they are ultimately talking about different things and not finding a direct moment of clash, or stasis. To explain the lack of argument she claims that partisans, people, “may not know that it is possible to frame propositions in such a way that a disagreement can achieve stasis and hence open the possibility of exchange. Or perhaps no party is willing to do the hard intellectual work that is necessary to construct refutations of the premises put forward by another” (p. 30)

This last passage is interesting to me because it seems to challenge her own assertions about spin. Let me see if I can be clear here. She claims that spin is not rhetoric, but that it is something else that complicates, blurs, has bias, and may leave things unintelligible- but why does this have to be? Can’t spin also be interpreted as rhetoric? Can’t spin be seen as one persons way of (as she states) framing propositions in such a way that a disagreement can achieve stasis and hence open the possibility of exchange? Can’t spin be an example of this intellectual hard work that is necessary to construct refutations of the premises put forward by another? Can’t spinning in itself become arguments and debates over acts and events?

I guess, for me,I need her to do some more explaining here in order for me to dismiss the art of spinning. To spin something, is to me, a rhetorical act. To spin something is to rhetorically and purposefully interpret with the intent to persuade. To spin is to create a new frame, it is to posit a position, it is rhetorical and able to be engaged. Whether or not the intentions are desirable at all times, whether or not spinning is the ideal form of rhetoric, whether or not we want to acknowledge this as rhetoric because of its stigmas- I think we may not want to dismiss spin so easy as something that isn’t rhetorical. And if we did, if we let Crowley tell us that spin isn’t rhetorical, doesn’t this invite us to not engage it? To not be literate in its use and understanding it? What then would be the impacts of dismissing spin as something that isn’t rhetorical?

Rhetoric and Statis

Rhetoric and Statis
Crowley’s book was interesting to underline the importance of statis. I do not remember reading about it before (if it was in Touliman’s book, probably I did not understand it). This comment stood out for me not just because it was new information for me, but it is a very common problem today’s arguments. People having different ideas on subjects just state their ideas and try to prove the legitimacy of theirs but their argument, claim does not have any relationship between the other side’s ideas or claims. So they are arguing together for different things.
I believe the most recent sample for this is Libya sample. Protestors and people in Libya want a change in the country because they think their country is not a democracy and they are not happy with the current government. They want the president resign. On the other hand, the president claims that there is no reason for him to resign, some people governed other countries more than him, and it is not Libyan people who started these rebels but other people. They do talk about the same problem but they “do not agree on the point which they disagree…” (p. 29).
This is the same with some of the political discussions. I do not remember how many times I though “What are you talking about, he did not ask you this” while watching discussions on TV.
Hayley, his comment “I use the masculine pronoun here because the liberal subject is coded as masculine” (p. 35) reminded me of you:))

Toulmin's skeleton for analyzing argument & arguing differently

I am currently taking a moment to reflect upon Toulmin's "first skeleton of a pattern for analyzing arguments" (1). This skeleton proposes that D (since W)- so C; or as an example Harry was born in Bermuda (since a man born in Bermuda will be a British subject)- So, Harry is a British subject (2). In this skeleton we can identify some core components to an argument. For example we have data, warrant, and claim. Claim is C, or Harry is a British Subject. The warrant is since W, or since a man born in Bermuda will be a British subject (that which is implicit). And the data is D, or Harry was born in Bermuda (that which is explicit).

Now when thinking of what is traditional argument or normal argument, in order to think about arguing differently, I am first interested in exploring this normal or traditional argument as presented by Toulmin. It seems just from this most basic skeleton that there may not be reason to change this structure- to create an alternative. However, maybe there is. Maybe this simplistic model is too simplistic. For example, it may in fact be inherently exclusionary because to rely on implicit messages may not be understood by all. What if this formula is used with people from different cultures, would that which is implicit be understood? Or would this skeleton for argument prove to have limitations? Also, what about the grounds that this skeleton may rest on? For instance, the warrant in the example above is based within law or legal grounds, and it may be possible that this law, or its legal framework, may be structurally or institutionally violent in some way or another, and thus to have ones argument based within a violent framework could prove to be problematic.

Now, lets suppose that we don't want to adjust this structure, but we are still interested in arguing differently. It seems as though we could use a cultural studies lens (as just 1 example) to examine what are some hegemonic and dominant ways of arguing in our culture? Tannen presents a nice starting point here. Additionally, I think Maxwells previous post which explores rhetoric and policy could also provide some rich grounds. But, once we can grasp some of the more dominant arguments, or modes of argument, we could then possibly not necessarily stray from Toulmins model, but we could offer alternatives to the dominant. For example, by understanding how our political process traditionally, normally, or hegemonically argues- we could then offer alternative types of argument. Or find ways to shift, reframe, play with inclusion and exclusion, or argue differently.

These are just some immediate ideas floating around as I think about arguing differently & Toulmins first skeleton of a pattern for analyzing argument.



1- P. 9 from Toulmin, S. E. (2003). The Uses of Argument. NY: Cambridge University Press.
2- P. 9 (same source as #1).

Oh Aristotle- How I want to support thee

Aristotle is a man who is full of ideas. He seems to believe wholeheartedly in his assertions which are soOooOOo totalizing and positivist that the frameworks he sets up and the rational(s) in which everything is pinned, ultimately leave little room for discussion. Including a conversation about arguing differently.

This is not to say that we can't discuss alternatives and that there isn't room for discussion; what I am positioning is that if I could sit and chat with him (would he even due to my vagina?) about rhetoric and argumentation I would be quite curious for how much he would be willing to flex, how much he would be willing to concede, and whether or not he would acknowledge that there are other ideas out there about happiness, why people do harm to others, that there may be more than two kinds of right and wrong towards others, that unjust actions may be divided into more than "two classes", that maybe everyone doesn't get a sense of pleasure from vengeance, etc. Ultimately, I question: Would he deviate from his passionate assertive Truths? As his work suggests, I am guessing no- even if I used his own framework to negate his affirmations I am guessing it may fall on deaf ears.

This is a point of concern for arguing differently. If this is what the "West" understands, and if this is what is the framework from which many other argumentation and rhetorical theories are based....then... what room is there for other voices? Other interpretations? Other practices?

After reading Aristotle I walk away with a mixed bag of feelings and knowledge(s). As a scholar and as someone that respects passionate convictions I most certainly respect him and his influence on the study of rhetoric. However, as someone who is critical of totalizing and positivistic claims (especially in such areas of research as rhetoric), as well as exclusionary frameworks (for example his role as a White Heteropatriarch which distinctly excludes people based on sex, gender, class, and race), I am very weary of his frameworks and my practical application of Aristotelian rhetorical methods. I, in a way, even feel guilty for having subscribed to his frameworks of rhetoric up until this point. As a communication instructor, for example, I have been regurgitating ethos, pathos, and logos in my instruction for years, and I am beginning to wonder if this is appropriate. Have we been misusing Aristotle? Have we reinvented his work today so that it barely resembles his original intentions? Am I reinstilling violent frameworks for others to follow? Have I caused damage because of this?

I am left with these thoughts, more than a passionate celebration of Aristotelian rhetoric.

Aristotle's Capital t Truth

I think Haley, Nilu, and I see eye to eye on a lot of the issues they brought up with Aristotle (see: post and comments). It's easy to play the doubting game, and as I found out last night, not being able to see any value in something (or better, not being able to see flaws in something else) exemplifies a lack of critical skills that create dangerous paradigms. I'll play the believing game for a moment, before getting to the main thrust of this post.

Aristotle's Rhetoric is good for what it is: one of the first written 'how to' Rhetoric guides. In my mind, I see this less as a treatise we should take completely to heart and more of an example of rhetoric in practice. To persuade effectively you need to know what makes people happy so you can make them happy when you speak. Here are 32 different things that make people happy and examples of each. You need to show your audience that you are a 'good' person so they take what you have to say to heart. Here are 32 different reasons why people are good and these are the ones that are most important. To persuade effectively about politics you need to know about politics. Here are the different kinds of government. And on and on.

However, I find myself really disagreeing with Aristotle when he gets to Ch.1 Bk12. In this section he talks about the reasons men decide to break the law. On lines 6-8 hey says that men will break the law if they "suppose that the thing can be done, and done by the,: either that they can do it without being found out, or if they are found out they can escape being punished, or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less then the gain for themselves or those they care for." As usual, Aristotle's generalizations are somewhat true, even to a contemporary audience. A person will do something that breaks with the status quo on right and wrong if they can do it without being caught. A person will still steal to feed his starving family. However, the reason I find myself doubting this so much is because I know that Aristotle was writing this (or it was written for Aristotle) in a time that had completely different views on right and wrong, different values of human life, and different categories for these universal capital t Truths. In one sense, Aristotle is making the argument that a man will escape the bonds of slavery if the payoff is greater than the cost. When the cost is one's life, and the payoff is freedom, it seems unlikely that there is going to be a rule set that explains away this one.

Anyway, I'm looking forward to hearing what you all think about this 'classic' text in the rhetorical tradition. But for now, I'm going to keep reading Aristotle with the expectation that this is a blueprint, a framework, for sharpening my persuasion skills. Nothing more.

Interesting Thread

There is an interesting thread at RSA's Blogora today. An old-school debate Comm guy wrote an article last year on how the dialogue and deliberation community has created a rather pejorative metaphor to describe debate's influence on Democracy.



I know this, of course, because I am a contributor :P

Rhetoric- Mans Art of Persuasion

As I slowly have begun reading Aristotle's rhetoric I can't help but think about Aristotle himself and what he is suggesting. Yes, he is supposed to be "the reference" for rhetoric, but it is hard for me to get past a few things. Before I get on my soap box, I would like to first mention a few constructive things that I am noticing that have inherent value in understanding "the art" of rhetoric.
As Karyal aptly summarized- rhetoric, according to Aristotle and as interpreted by Aristotle, has uses. The most important of these, which I think hints at some of the dialogic qualities admired by Cathy, and myself, is the idea that when we engage the art of persuasion it is important to acknowledge and understand opposing, or in my mind- other sides. Aristotle specifically states that "We must be able to employ persuasion...on opposite sides of a question...in order that we may see clearly what the facts are" (Aristotle, para 7). Now if I understand Aristotle correctly it is important to understand the other side in order to better our advancement of what is good and true, and so that we may be able to call out an adversary that is arguing unfairly or for what is not good or untrue. Although, this has its merits, especially during forensic oratory, I would rather spin this idea by Aristotle into a dialogic use of rhetoric. One that is concerned not just for what is being said in refutation, but also being open to what is said and having respect for the one, or others, that are speaking in refutation. Within the process of understanding the "other side", or in my perspective all the other sides, there is room for one to embrace the principles of dialogue that I cherish, such as: empathy for the other speaker(s), and compassion toward the speakers involved and the subject(s) at hand.

With this said, I am having trouble getting behind his framing of rhetoric (note, I am not that far in the readings) because of its grounding in forensic oratory, his elitist perspective ("there are people whom one cannot instruct" (Aristotle, para 7)), and his positioning and use of MAN. Although there is value in understanding forensic oratory, I don't believe in his rhetorical values of "arriving at truth" and what is just. Truth, with a capital T, is a myth in my humble opinion as well as what is "just". To arrive at what is "just" is inherently grounded in a penal structure with discipline and punishment as tools to check those who are unjust. The flaw here, is that in many instances of justice, and things that are systematically found to be just- I personally have found to be unjust. Thus, to ground rhetoric within the framework of seeking Truth and Justice, or what is Just, is a framework that I am uninterested in, mostly because of its inherently flawed and oppressive natures.

Next, his elitist perspective shows inherent problems with his ideas of rhetoric. Although, this highlights the importance of the audience in rhetoric, I find that to suggest that there are those that are unable to be instructed is problematic. It suggests a privileged position which arguably can inhibit communication, place class value on speech, and can ultimately leave people out of important conversation. In fact, I would like to go so far as to say, that it is such people as he describes as uninstructable, that should be included in conversations and rhetoric (whether political or forensic).

Finally, although his referencing of men as the agents of rhetoric is subject to the times that Aristotle was alive, I still have a hard time excusing it and getting on board. Anytime that people reference people with the terms MAN all I can think of is how historically that term was used to include a very specific group of people (White men with certain class positions- and more recently heterosexual) and exclude most others (Women, persons of color (note: i understand the contentiousness of this term- can you suggest another- it is hard with out limited language), the disabled/handicapped, and many others).

So, as I continue reading Aristotle's rhetoric I will try to put my soap box aside and employ the qualities that I seek in rhetoric, argument, and communication. I will openly try to understand what he is saying, why he is saying it, and respect him as a speaker. I just hope there aren't too many more references of Man- because as someone who isn't his intended audience, as someone who he literally was excluding from the conversation of rhetoric, it kind of hurts since I enjoy rhetoric so much.