Last week I posted a summary of Richard Rorty's
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature on my blog, where I briefly discussed the difference between analytic (true in virtue of meaning alone) and synthetic (true in virtue of meaning + how the world is) truths. Rorty draws on Quine, who earlier had made a convincing argument that there are, in reality, no analytic truths, since every statement is inextricably connected to a set of assumptions about reality. In reading Toulmin, I once again hear echoes of the philosophical arguments going on around him. Warrants have backing, and one can, ad infinitum, continue to ask for backing for the backing. Yet it is interesting to notice that Toulmin makes a practical claim that Quine does not, which is to say that certain warrants (or backing for those warrants) can be accepted on face value alone: "the acceptability of the most reliable warrants is something we are entitled to take for granted" (p. 99). Once again we see Toulmin's interest in the actual practical level of engaging with one another in making arguments, for his concern is that if we become caught up in the infinite web of backing for our warrants, we will never begin to argue!
Yet, I wonder, how it is that some warrants would be deemed to be “reliable” and others not? Is it, as Rorty would contend, a matter of whether society allows us to claim it as true? And, if then, what is “society”? Who decides? One of the exciting things about inquiry is to question assumed truths. Yet, at a certain point, we do just need to sit down and talk with one another!
One of my hopes is to teach a course on communication ethics. It certainly seems that this question of reliable warrants would be particularly sharpened when making ethical arguments. Hmmm…a possible semester project?
Cathy,
ReplyDeleteI was a bit surprised when I read Touliman said ethical arguments cannot be analytic. Again the question comes who decides the rules in ethic, the society, then who is society..... it goes forever.
Toulmin rejects pragmatism's theory of knowledge, but he embraces its theory of backing: doubt itself requires good reason. Without a good reason for doubting, one is not entitled to skepticism.
ReplyDeleteIn Toulmin's terms, if I want to "doubt" that Newton's laws hold (at a certain level), I need to supply good reasons for that doubt before I am entitled to it.
In other words, pragmatism seeks to make skepticism responsible.
Cathy - yes, I was also wondering about the idea of reliable and unreliable warrants. It seems Toulmin is after certain warrants that stand as reliable irrespective of social circumstance. But, as you've mentioned, that view would be against the notion of relativity and social construction. Or, is it that he is calling them reliable/ unreliable based on a contract between the speaker and the listener?
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