Analytic arguments, Quine and Toulmin

Last week I posted a summary of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature on my blog, where I briefly discussed the difference between analytic (true in virtue of meaning alone) and synthetic (true in virtue of meaning + how the world is) truths. Rorty draws on Quine, who earlier had made a convincing argument that there are, in reality, no analytic truths, since every statement is inextricably connected to a set of assumptions about reality. In reading Toulmin, I once again hear echoes of the philosophical arguments going on around him. Warrants have backing, and one can, ad infinitum, continue to ask for backing for the backing. Yet it is interesting to notice that Toulmin makes a practical claim that Quine does not, which is to say that certain warrants (or backing for those warrants) can be accepted on face value alone: "the acceptability of the most reliable warrants is something we are entitled to take for granted" (p. 99). Once again we see Toulmin's interest in the actual practical level of engaging with one another in making arguments, for his concern is that if we become caught up in the infinite web of backing for our warrants, we will never begin to argue!

Yet, I wonder, how it is that some warrants would be deemed to be “reliable” and others not? Is it, as Rorty would contend, a matter of whether society allows us to claim it as true? And, if then, what is “society”? Who decides? One of the exciting things about inquiry is to question assumed truths. Yet, at a certain point, we do just need to sit down and talk with one another!

One of my hopes is to teach a course on communication ethics. It certainly seems that this question of reliable warrants would be particularly sharpened when making ethical arguments. Hmmm…a possible semester project?

Warrants- Returning to Toulmin as a path to arguing differently

I wanted to take a moment to focus on warrants since they are important parts of arguments, but also seem to be a topic of discussion on the blog. First, it seems important to distinguish what a warrant is. According to Toulmin warrants are appealed to implicitly, while data is what is appealed to explicitly (1). Also, data depend on warrants we operate within and therefore qualifiers  are necessary to discuss explicitly the extent to which the degree of force in which the data confers the claim (2). However, with this said qualifiers must be understood as distinct from warrants (2).

From Toulmins framework it seems as though the implicit nature of a warrant would then seem to be a reason why it may be hard to explicitly identify in a source, and even harder to articulate. I could imagine this being a problem not just for undergraduates, but for us (academics) as well as politicians. For example, it seems as though some of the political debates that the public are privy to watch or listen to may miss the mark when it comes to identifying the warrants and engaging arguments on their basis. Additionally, when thinking about arguing differently we may come to see that this could be just including the step of identifying warrants, engaging debate through warrants, and thus returning to a Toulmin model. Thoughts?
 
 
(1)- Toulman, S. E. (2003). The Uses of Argument. NY:Cambridge University Press.- p. 92
(2)- Toulman- p. 93

Teaching Toulmin and Recognizing Warrants

During the last month we have taught the students in Communication 3050 (Survey of Communication Theory) the Toulmin Method for analyzing arguments. They had a homework exercise in which they had to read a news article and label the claim, data, and warrant, and also find the reservation, qualifier, and backing. What quickly became clear is that they found it much easier to label the claim and the data than to articulate the warrant. They also had a hard time distinguishing the data that supported the warrant (the backing) from the data that supported the primary claim.

Being able to articulate the warrant, it seems to me, is crucial to understanding an argument, and also to being able to listen generously to someone else’s argument. If part of our goal is to argue differently, to be able to, in Aikido fashion, move alongside someone else who may differ from us, it seems to me that doing so means being able to name the warrant in our own position, and in the other person’s position. The warrants may be diametrically opposed (as in the abortion debate), but they may just be implicit and not well understood, even by the one holding the position.

One of the reasons I enjoy philosophy (and particularly philosophy of language) so much is that good philosophical investigation, it seems to me, asks us to step back and examine the warrants in our arguments. How does this connect with that? What assumptions are we making to connect that data to that claim? Do we really have a warrant for using this example to support our position? Could we grant that someone else’s position is, in fact, based on the same data, but seeing it through the lens of a different warrant?