Last week I posted a summary of Richard Rorty's
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature on my blog, where I briefly discussed the difference between analytic (true in virtue of meaning alone) and synthetic (true in virtue of meaning + how the world is) truths. Rorty draws on Quine, who earlier had made a convincing argument that there are, in reality, no analytic truths, since every statement is inextricably connected to a set of assumptions about reality. In reading Toulmin, I once again hear echoes of the philosophical arguments going on around him. Warrants have backing, and one can, ad infinitum, continue to ask for backing for the backing. Yet it is interesting to notice that Toulmin makes a practical claim that Quine does not, which is to say that certain warrants (or backing for those warrants) can be accepted on face value alone: "the acceptability of the most reliable warrants is something we are entitled to take for granted" (p. 99). Once again we see Toulmin's interest in the actual practical level of engaging with one another in making arguments, for his concern is that if we become caught up in the infinite web of backing for our warrants, we will never begin to argue!
Yet, I wonder, how it is that some warrants would be deemed to be “reliable” and others not? Is it, as Rorty would contend, a matter of whether society allows us to claim it as true? And, if then, what is “society”? Who decides? One of the exciting things about inquiry is to question assumed truths. Yet, at a certain point, we do just need to sit down and talk with one another!
One of my hopes is to teach a course on communication ethics. It certainly seems that this question of reliable warrants would be particularly sharpened when making ethical arguments. Hmmm…a possible semester project?
